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Abstract— SQL Injection attacks on web applications have 
become one of the most important information security 
concerns over the past few years. This paper presents a hybrid 
approach based on the Adaptive Intelligent Intrusion Detector 
Agent (AIIDA-SQL) for the detection of those attacks. The 
AIIDA-SQL agent incorporates a Case-Based Reasoning 
(CBR) engine which is equipped with learning and adaptation 
capabilities for the classification of SQL queries and detection 
of malicious user requests. To carry out the tasks of  attack 
classification and detection, the agent incorporates advanced 
algorithms in the reasoning cycle stages. Concretely, an 
innovative classification model based on a mixture of an 
Artificial Neuronal Network together with a Support Vector 
Machine is applied in the reuse stage of the CBR cycle. This 
strategy enables to classify the received SQL queries in a 
reliable way. Finally, a projection neural technique is 
incorporated, which notably eases the revision stage carried 
out by human experts in the case of suspicious queries. The 
experimental results obtained on a real-traffic case study show 
that AIIDA-SQL performs remarkably well in practice. 
Agent, Case-Based Reasoning, Support Vector Machine, 
Artificial Neural Network, SQL Injection, Intrusion Detection  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In recent years, Internet attacks have increased due to the 
large number of information systems connected to the 
Internet. One of the most serious security threats around Web 
applications and databases has been the SQL Injection attack 
[1]. This attack can be used to gain confidential information, 
to bypass authentication mechanisms, to modify the 
database, and to execute arbitrary code [2]. A large number 
of solutions has been proposed so far [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], 
[8], [9], but they can not defend against sophisticated attack 
techniques such as those that use alternate encodings and 
database commands to dynamically construct SQL strings. 
These approaches lack the learning and adaptation 
capabilities for dealing with attacks and their possible 
variations in the future. In addition, a limitation of the 
majority of these solutions is that they are based on 
centralized mechanisms with little capacity to work in 
distributed and dynamic environments. 
This paper introduces the hybrid intelligent agent named 
AIIDA-SQL (Adaptive Intelligent Intrusion Detector Agent), 
designed according to the strategy of an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) and aimed at detecting SQL injection attacks.  
AIIDA-SQL is characterized by the integration of a Case-
Based Reasoning (CBR) engine which provides it with a 
great level of adaptation and learning capability, since CBR 
systems make use of past experiences to solve new problems 
[10]. This is very effective for blocking SQL injection 
attacks as the ID mechanism uses a strategy based on 
anomaly detection [11]. 
In addition to the CBR motor in the AIIDA-SQL agent’s 
internal structure, an integrated mixture of an Artificial 
Neural Network (ANN) and a Support Vector Machine 
(SVM) is used as a classification mechanism. By using this 
mixture, it is possible to exploit the advantages of both 
strategies in order to classify the SQL queries in a more 
reliable way. Finally, to assist the expert in the making of 
decisions regarding those queries classified as suspicious, a 
visualization mechanism is proposed which combines 
clustering techniques and unsupervised neural models to 
reduce the dimensionality of the data. 
AIIDA-SQL is the principal component of a distributed 
hierarchical multi-agent system (MAS) aimed at detecting 
different attacks in dynamic and distributed environments. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 
describes the problem that has prompted most of this 
research work. Section 3 explains the internal structure of the 
AIIDA-SQL agent used as a classifier and visualizer agent. 
Finally, the conclusions and experimental results of this 
work are presented in section 4. 
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II. SQL INJECTION ATTACKS 
An SQL injection attack takes place when a hacker 
changes the semantic or syntactic logic of an SQL text string 
by inserting SQL keywords or special symbols within the 
original SQL command which is executed at the database 
layer of an application [1]. Different attack techniques exist 
which include the use of SQL tautologies, logic errors / 
illegal queries, union query and piggy-backed queries. Other 
more advanced techniques use injection based on 
interference and alternative codification [1]. The cause of the 
SQL injection attacks is relatively simple: an inadequate 
input validation on the user interface. As a result of this 
attack, a hacker can be responsible for unauthorized data 
handling, retrieval of confidential information, and in the 
worst possible case, taking over control of the application 
server [1].  
Different strategies have been presented as a solution to 
the problem of SQL injection attacks [1], with special 
attention given to strategies based on IDSs [2], [3], [4], [5], 
[6], [7], [8], [9]. One approach based on anomaly detection 
was proposed by [2], applying a clustering strategy to group 
similar queries and isolate queries which are considered 
malicious. The main disadvantage of this approach is in its 
high computational overhead which would affect a real-time 
detection. Kemalis and Tzouramanis propose SQL-IDS 
(SQL Injection Detection System) [4] that uses security 
specifications to capture the syntactic structure of the SQL 
queries generated by the applications. The main limitation of 
this approach is the computational cost while comparing the 
new query with the predefined structure at runtime. 
In [5] two types of SQL injection attacks are raised: 
tautology attacks and those based on the UNION operator. 
Through the syntactic analysis of SQL query strings, the data 
of the HTTP requests are extracted to later be used in the 
training phase and to determine the threshold to use in the 
evaluation phase. Bertino, Kamra and Early [5] propose an 
anomaly detection mechanism applying data mining 
techniques. The main problem of this approach is to find an 
adequate threshold to maintain a low rate of both false 
positives and false negatives. Another anomaly-based 
approach is proposed by Robertson, Vigna, Kruegel and 
Kemmerer [7]. The approach uses generalisation techniques 
to convert suspicious requests within abnormal signatures. 
These signatures are later used to group malicious requests 
which present similar characteristics. Another of the used 
techniques is characterization, that deduces the type of attack 
associated with a malicious request. A low computational 
overhead is generated. However, it is susceptible to 
generating false positives. The algorithm ID3, presented by 
Garcia, Monroy and Quintana [8], proposes the detection of 
attacks targeted at web applications. The algorithm ID3 is 
used to detect and filter malicious SQL strings, presenting a 
significant percentage of incorrect classifications. Valeur, 
Mutz, and Vigna [9] propose the use of anomaly detection 
through the generation of a series of models beginning with a 
set of recovered queries. At execution time, they monitor the 
applications in order to identify requests which are not 
associated with the aforementioned models. 
III. AN ADAPTIVE INTELLIGENT AGENT FOR DETECTING 
SQL INJECTION ATTACKS 
Agents are characterized by their autonomy, which gives 
them the ability to work independently and in real-time 
environments [12]. The AIIDA-SQL agent presented in this 
study interacts with other agents within an architecture still 
under development. These agents carry out tasks related to 
message capture and syntactic analysis, administration, and 
user interaction. As opposed to the tasks performed by these 
agents, the AIIDA-SQL agent executes classification SQL 
queries that we will subsequently define in greater detail. 
CBR is a paradigm based on the idea that similar 
problems have similar solutions. Thus, a new problem is 
resolved by consulting the case memory to find a similar 
case which has been resolved in the past. When working 
with this type of systems, the key concept is that of “case”. A 
case is defined as a previous experience and is composed of 
three elements: a description of the problem that depicts the 
initial problem; a solution that describes the sequence of 
actions performed in order to solve the problem; and the final 
state, which describes the state that was achieved once the 
solution was applied. 
As previously mentioned, the AIIDA-SQL agent is an 
specialization of a CBR agent which is the key component of 
a multi-agent architecture and is geared towards classifying 
SQL queries for the detection of SQL injection attacks. 
Below, a new classification mechanism incorporated in the 
internal structure of the AIIDA-SQL agent is explained in 
detail. 
A. AIIDA-SQL Agent 
In this section the AIIDA-SQL agent is presented, with 
special attention paid to its internal structure and the 
classification mechanism of SQL attacks. This mechanism 
combines the advantages of CBR systems, such as learning 
and adaptation, with the predictive capabilities of a 
combination of ANNs and SVMs. The use of this mixture of 
techniques is based on the possibility of using two classifiers 
together to detect suspicious queries in the most reliable way. 
In terms of CBR, a case is composed of elements of the 
analysed SQL query described as follows:  
• Problem: describes the initial information available for 
generating a plan. The problem description consists of: 
case identification, user session and SQL query 
elements. 
• Solution: states the action carried out in order to solve 
the problem (in this case, the applied prediction models).  
• Final State: describes the state achieved after applying 
the solution. 
The fields defining a case are as follows:  IdCase, 
Session, User, IP_Address, Query_SQL, Affected_table, 
Affected_field, Command_type, Word_GroupBy, 
Word_Having, Word_OrderBy, Numer_And, Numer_Or, 
Number_literals, Number_LOL, Length_SQL_String, 
Start_Time_Execution, End_Time_Execution, and 
Query_Category. Additionally, the information related to the 
used prediction models is stored as well. 
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In Fig. 1, the different stages applied in the reasoning 
cycle can be seen. 
 
Figure 1.  CBR cycle and classification mechanism of the AIIDA-SQL 
agent. 
In the retrieval stage, there is a selection of queries sorted 
by their type and the memory classification models. In the 
reuse phase, as seen in Fig. 1, a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) 
and an SVM are simultaneously applied to carry out the 
prediction of the new query. Subsequently, a new inspection 
is performed which can be done automatically or by a human 
expert. In the case of the query resulting as suspicious, 
further visual inspection will be carried out by a human 
expert. At this stage, the most similar cases are selected by 
means of a Growing Cell Structures (GCS) network [13], 
and visualized by the unsupervised neuronal model named 
Cooperative Maximum Likelihood Hebbian Learning 
(CMLHL). As a result, the human expert will graphically see 
the relationship between the suspicious query and the 
recovered most similar queries. During learning, memory 
information regarding the cases and models will be updated. 
Below, the different stages of the CBR reasoning cycle 
associated with the system are described in more detail. 
1) Retrieve 
The retrieval phase is broken down into two phases; case 
retrieval and model retrieval. Case retrieval is performed by 
using the Query_Category attribute which retrieves queries 
from the case memory (Cr) which were used for a similar 
query in accordance with attributes of the new case cn. 
Subsequently, the models for the MLP (mlpr) and SVM 
(svmr) associated with the recovered cases are retrieved. The 
recovery of these memory models allows the improvement 
of the system’s performance so that the time necessary for 
the creation of models will be considerably reduced, mainly 
in the case of the ANN training. 
2) Reuse 
The reuse phase inputs are the information of the 
retrieved cases Cr and the recovered models mlpr and svmr. 
The combination of MLPs and SVMs is fundamental in the 
reduction of the false negative rate.  The inputs of the MLP 
are: Query_SQL, Affected_table, Affected_field, 
Command_type, Word_GroupBy, Word_Having, 
Word_OrderBy, Numer_And, Numer_Or, Number_literals, 
Number_LOL, and Length_SQL_String. The number of 
neurons in the hidden layer is 2n+1, where n is the number 
of neurons in the input layer. Finally, there is one neuron in 
the output layer. The activation function selected for the 
different layers has been the sigmoid. Taking into account 
the activation function fj, the calculation of output values are 
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The outputs correspond to xr. As the neurons exiting from 
the hidden layer of the neural network contain sigmoidal 
neurons with values between [0, 1], the incoming variables 
are redefined so that their range falls between [0.2, 0.8]. This 
transformation is necessary because the network does not 
deal with values that fall outside of this range. The outgoing 
values are similarly limited to the range of [0.2, 0.8] with the 
value of 0.2 corresponding to a non-attack and the value of 
0.8 corresponding to an attack. The network training is 
carried out through the error Backpropagation algorithm 
[14]. 
At the same time as the estimation through neuronal 
networks is performed, it is also carried out by the SVM 
model, a supervised learning technique applied to the 
classification and regression of elements. The algorithm 
represents an extension of nonlinear models [15]. 
Additionally, SVM allows the separation of element classes 
which are not linearly separable. To do so, the space of 
initial coordinates is mapped in a high dimensionality space 
through the use of functions. Due to the fact that the 
dimensionality of the new space can be very high, it is not 
feasible to calculate hyperplanes that allow the production of 
linear separability. For this reason, a series of non-linear 
functions called kernels is used. 
Let us consider a set of patterns 
)},(),...,,(),,{( 2211 mm yxyxyxT =  where xi is a vector 
of the dimension n. The idea is to convert the elements xi in a 
space of high dimensionality through the application of a 
function, in such a way that the set of original patterns is 
converted into the following set 
)}),((),...,),((),),({()( 2211 mm yxyxyxT ΦΦΦ=Φ  
that, depending on the selected function )(xΦ , could be 
linearly separable. To carry out the classification, this 
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The selected kernel function in this problem was 
polynomial. The values used for the estimation are 
dominated by decision values and are related to the distance 
from the points to the hyperplane. 
75
Once the output values for the ANN and the SVM are 
obtained, the mixture is performed by means of a weighted 
average of the error rate of each one of the techniques. A 
weighted average is applied to take into account the error 
rate of each technique. If different classifications are 
obtained from each technique, the query would then be 
classified as suspicious, and subsequent revision would be 
launched. Before carrying out the average, the values are 
normalized to the interval [0, 1], as SVM provides positive 
and negative values and those of greater magnitude.  
3) Revise 
The revise phase can be manual or automatic depending 
on the output values. The automatic review is given for non-
suspicious cases during the estimation obtained for the reuse 
phase. For cases detected as suspicious, with output values 
experimentally determined in the interval [0.35, 0.6], a 
review by a human expert is visually performed. As CBR 
learns, the interval values are automatically adjusted to the 
smallest of the false negatives. The greater limit is constantly 
maintained throughout the iterations. The review consists of 
recovering queries that are the most similar to the current one 
together with their previous classifications. This combines a 
clustering technique for the selection of similar requests with 
a neuronal model for the reduction of dimensionality, which 
permits visualisation in 2D or 3D as shown in Figs. 3 and 4.  
The selection of similar cases is carried out through the 
use of a neural GCS network. The different cases are 
distributed in meshes and the mesh containing the new case 
is selected. To visualize the similar cases (those in the 
selected mesh), the dimensionality of data is reduced by 
means of the CMLHL neural model [17] which performs 
Exploratory Projection Pursuit by unsupervised learning. 
Considering an N-dimensional input vector (x), and an M-
dimensional output vector (y), with ijW being the weight 
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Lateral activation passing: 
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Weight update: 
 ( ) 1||.. −=Δ pjjiij eesignyW η   (6) 
Where: η  is the learning rate, τ  is the “strength” of the 
lateral connections, b the bias parameter, p a parameter 
related to the energy function [15], [16] and A is a symmetric 
matrix used to modify the response to the data [15]. The 
effect of this matrix is based on the relation between the 
distances separating the output neurons. 
Finally, the information is represented and the associated 
queries are recovered with the retrieved mesh, as can be seen 
in Figs. 3 and 4. 
4) Retain 
The learning phase updates the information of the new 
classified case and reconstructs the classifiers offline to leave 
the system available for new classifications. The ANN 
classifier is reconstructed only when an erroneous 
classification is produced. In the case of a reference to 
inspection of suspicious queries, information and classifiers 
are updated when the expert modifies the information. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
To empirically test the proposed approach with a real-life 
dataset, legal queries were sent from a designed user 
interfaces of a made-to-measure web application. SQLMAP 
0.5 [18] was used to automatically dispatch malicious 
queries. This tool is able to fingerprint an extensive DBMS 
back-end and retrieve remote DBMS databases. 
To compare the success rates, a test on the classification 
of queries was conducted by applying the following 
classifiers: Bayesian Network, Naive Bayes, AdaBoost M1, 
Bagging, DecisionStump, J48, JRIP, LMT, Logistic, 
LogitBoost, MultiBoosting AdaBoost, OneR, SMO, and 
Stacking. The different classifiers were applied to 705 
previously classified queries (437 legal queries and 268 
attacks). The consecutive process to carry out the output test 
was the following: selecting one of the cases, extracting it 
from the set, conducting the model starting from the 
remaining cases and classifying the extracted case. This 
process is repeated for each one of the cases and techniques 
in order to analyze each query without it being used to build 
the model. The performance of the different classifiers can 
be seen in Fig. 2.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Total number of hits for the different classifiers. 
As can be seen in Fig. 2, the highest-performance system 
is AIIDA-SQL, whith a success rate of 698/705. 
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As an example, an illegal query has been selected from 
the existing ones: 
Select TBorder_customer.id_order, brands, code, name, price 
from TBorder_brands, TBorder_customer, TBproduct where 
TBorder_customer.id_order = TBorder_brands.id_order and 
TBproduct.code = TBorder_brands.code and 
TBorder_customer.id_order = 1 AND ORD(MID((SELECT 7 
FROM information_schema.TABLES LIMIT 0, 1), 1, 1)) > 63 order 
by brands 
The query is a clear case of SQL injection so it should be 
classified as an attack. The system classifies this query as 
illegal since an output value of 0.84 is given by the 
classifiers mixture. Fig. 3 shows the provided visualization 
of queries if the manual revise phase would have been 
carried out. The most similar queries are recovered and 
depicted in different colours: legal queries are shown in 
green, attacks in red and the analysed query in blue. Non-
recovered queries are shown in grey. The above detailed 
illegal query is closer to the group of queries in red, so the 
human expert would clearly consider this query as an illegal 
one. 
 
Figure 3.  Visualization of SQL queries in the revise stage. 
The number of queries detected as suspicious in the test 
of Fig. 1 was limited to seven, being one of them the 
following query: 
Update table TBcustomer set name = 'Jose', lastname = 'Perez', 
city = 'Murcia', province = 'Murcia', ZC = 37008 where id = test' 
or id = 'test2' 
This query is not a clear attack because it is usual to have 
a literal in the right side of the or operator, and it can be legal 
or suspicious. 
The value obtained by the ANN for this query was 0.24. 
However, SVM deemed that the output value was 0.48. The 
mixture gave an output value of 0.36, which is in the range 
of suspicious queries. If the ANN would have been applied 
alone it would have considered this query as a valid one. 
However, the SVM would have considered it as an attack. 
The mixture deemed suspicious and a review was carried out 
manually. 
During the visual review, similar queries were recovered 
and the data dimensionality was reduced to perform 3D 
visualization. The obtained result to be shown to the human 
expert is depicted in Fig. 4. At first glance, it can be 
determined that the query is a legal one viewing the position 
with respect to the similar queries.  
Two examples of the similar queries recovered for the 
manual review are shown below. 
Update table TBorder_customer set state = 'P' AND 
ORD(MID((SELECT 4 FROM information_schema.TABLES LIMIT 
0, 1), 2, 1)) > 1 AND '1'='1' where date between '2008-05-05 
00:00:00' and '2008-05-05 23:23:23' 
Update table TBcustomer set name = 'Jose', lastname = 'Perez', 
city = 'Murcia', province= 'Murcia', ZC = 37008 where id = 'test' 
The first one is a clear attack, while the second is not. 
As a conclusion, it can be said that the combination of 
different Artificial Intelligence paradigms allows the 
development of a hybrid intelligent system with 
characteristics such as the capacity for learning and 
reasoning, flexibility and robustness which make the 
detection of SQL injection attacks possible. The proposed 
AIIDA-SQL agent is capable of detecting these abnormal 
situations with low error rates compared with other existing 
techniques, as shown in Fig. 2. There are not strong 
differences in the performance of the best techniques, but in 
the case of computer security only one false negative is very 
important as it could extremely damage the protected system. 
Some other techniques could be applied in the mixture to 
improve the performance. The presented approach also 
provides a decision mechanism which eases the review of 
suspicious queries through the selection of similar queries 
and their visualization by means of an unsupervised neural 
model. For future work, we will thoroughly study the query 
clustering process in order to take into account the 
characteristics of queries with greatest influence in SQL 
injections. 
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Figure 4.  SQL queries recovered in the revise stage. 
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